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Abstract
This paper studies a consumer search model with prospect utility in a hybrid uncertain
environment. Hybrid uncertainty consists of the uncertainty of the consumer’s
valuation for each product and the randomness of stockout. An optimal search strategy
is designed for the consumer to search or buy a product. The results show that the
presence of prospect utility can result in low purchase threshold. By comparative
statics, we demonstrate that the consumer’s purchase threshold for low-value product
increases with the risk coefficients for gains and losses, while the purchase threshold
for high-value product decreases with the risk coefficients for gains and losses. In
addition, we find that the consumer who is more sensitive to the loss will search for
much less products. Finally, some numerical examples are given to illustrate the
relationships between the model without and with prospect utility and further verify
the effectiveness and credibility of the conclusions.
Keywords: Consumer search; Prospect theory; Loss aversion; Optimal stopping;
Uncertain random variable
Introduction
Reference points and the different perceptions of gains and losses play an important
role in actual consumer economics [1]. In a commodity market, consumers’ purchase
decisions depend not only on their valuations for the current product but also on their
reference valuations for the past observed product. Kahneman and Tversky [2] and
Tversky and Kahneman [3,4] suggest that the perception of potential losses may be much
more important in determining behavior than the perceptions of potential gains. This is
known as prospect utility which is fear of loss rather than hope of gain that limits con-
sumer’s purchase behavior. These characteristics are often ignored in dynamic consumer
search which do not take into account prospect utility in searching differentiated but
substitutable products.
Generally speaking, there is uncertain information in the existing patterns of consumer
search models. The number of differentiated but substitutable products is assumed to be
finite in the market. Probability distributions of the products’ value are usually assumed
to be known to consumers before searching, but consumers do not know which firm will
offer which product value. In the real world, some information, such as quality, pattern,
and size of one product, cannot be exactly predicted by consumers in advance, thus result-
ing in the unknown frequencies. Therefore, probability theory is no longer applicable to
© 2015 Zhou et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited.
Zhou et al. Journal of Uncertainty Analysis and Applications  (2015) 3:6 Page 2 of 20
characterize such kind of uncertain information, because the lack of the frequency leads
to the unknowable probability distribution. Since the valuation of the consumer to each
product is subjective and the products are heterogeneous, the valuations can be charac-
terized as independent but not identically distributed uncertain variables [5]. Moreover,
products are randomly out of stock at a point in time. This is a realistic assumption. For
example, a study of more than 71,000 consumers in 29 countries shows that they have
little patience for stockouts.Once facing with a stockout, 21% to 43% of consumers will
actually go to another store to buy a substitute producta. The valuation is an uncertain
variable and the availability of previous product is random; thus, the maximum valuation
between the current product and the best previous product can be characterized as an
uncertain random variable [6]. Hence, the so-called twofold uncertainty is involved in this
paper which consists of the uncertain product value and the random stockout.
This paper provides a simple explanation for how prospect utility affects consumers’
purchase behaviors in a hybrid uncertain environment. We study a consumer search
model with prospect utility in which the consumer searches sequentially and evaluates
each product on the basis of multiple attributes. The multiple attributes of a product
include the price, quality, color, pattern, material, and size of a product [7]. In the search
process, the consumer exhibits loss aversion and decides when to stop searching for new
substitute products by buying one of the products which have been encountered so far.
An optimal stopping rule and an optimal search strategy are presented to maximize the
benefit of the consumer. To discuss the effects of prospect utility on purchase threshold,
we make a comparison between the model without and with prospect utility. By com-
parative statics, we further investigate the effects of risk coefficients for gains and losses,
coefficient of loss aversion on the consumer’s purchase threshold.
As a result of intercomparison between the model without and with prospect utility, we
find that the purchase decisions of a consumer under prospect utility exhibit low purchase
levels. Moreover, we show that the consumer’s purchase threshold is decreasing with the
search cost and is increasing with the probability of stockout. The product that has a
good reputation will be preferred in the optimal search strategy. Our analysis also reveals
some intriguing comparative statics. In our model, the consumer’s purchase threshold for
low-value productb monotonically increases as the risk coefficients for gains and losses
become larger; the purchase threshold for high-value product decreases as the risk coeffi-
cients for gains and losses increase, holding other parameters of the model constant. Our
findings also offer a theoretical explanation of the experimental evidence that consumers
generally stop searching too early [8]. We demonstrate the consumer’s purchase thresh-
old is decreasing with the coefficient of loss aversion. This implies that if loss aversion is
larger, the consumer will search for much less products because of low purchase thresh-
old. Finally, our numerical analysis shows that the reservation value in the model with
prospect utility will be lower than that in the model without prospect utility in a wider
number range. These results further illustrate the feasibility of the comparative statics.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: In the ‘Literature review’ section,
we present our literature review. The ‘Preliminaries’ section recalls some fundamental
concepts and formulas about uncertainty theory and chance theory. ‘The model without
prospect utility’ section describes the consumer search model without prospect utility.
‘The model without prospect utility’ section studies the same model with prospect util-
ity. We present an optimal search strategy and investigate the relationship between the
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reservation values without and with prospect utility. The ‘Comparative statics’ section
discusses the effects of prospect utility’s parameters on the reservation value. The numer-
ical examples are provided in the ‘Numerical examples’ section, and we conclude in the
‘Conclusion’ section.
Literature review
The consumer search problem has attracted wide attention in the academic literature.
Stahl [9] discussed a simple consumer search problem in which consumers search sequen-
tially with perfect recall and a finite number of identical stores compete by choosing prices
for a homogeneous good. Cachon et al. [10] studied a model in which consumers search
among multiple competing firms for products. Branco et al. [7] established a continuous-
time search model of gradual learning, in which consumers incur search costs to learn
product information and update their expected utility of the product at each search occa-
sion. Arbatskaya [11] presented an ordered search model that yields an equilibrium in
which there is price dispersion, prices and profits decline in the order of search, and
consumers with lower search costs search longer and obtain better deals. Based on the
ordered search model, Wilson [12] studied a problem that consumers are allowed to
choose the optimal order in which to search firms and firms are able to obfuscate this
order by deliberately increasing search costs and prices. Zhou [13] improved the ordered
search model in which consumers search both for price and product fitness. Chen and
Zhang [14] considered a consumer search model in a homogeneous product market
where uninformed consumers search for price information. Haan and Moraga-González
[15] studied the model that when consumers search for products, they first visit the firm
whose advertising is most salient. Chen and He [16] studied a model of product differen-
tiation in which the auction of advertisement positions is embedded in a market game of
consumer search.
Recent research trends in consumer search investigate the issue of boundedly rational
consumer behavior. For example, Hardie et al. [17] developed a multinomial logit for-
mulation of a reference-dependent choice model. They assumed that consumer choice is
influenced by the position of brands relative to multiattribute reference points and loss
aversion is exhibited. Weng [18] considered the sequential search problem where sellers
search for the best price from a known distribution and exhibit asymmetric regretting
and rejoicing. Zhou [19] considered a consumer search model and examined the impli-
cations of consumer reference dependence for market competition. He also finds that
consumer loss aversion in the price dimension intensifies competition while that in the
product dimension softens competition. Kuksov and Wang [20] also examined how the
competitive strategy and profitability of firms are affected by the presence of consumer
loss aversion in the price dimension. The above literature has neither studied any con-
sumer’s search strategy in conjunction with nonlinear prospect utility nor discussed the
probabilistic stockout of products.
The prospect theory originates in the work of Kahneman and Tversky [2]. The most
prominent feature of prospect theory is loss aversion, that is, people care much more
about losses relative to their reference level than about gains. It (in particular, loss
aversion) has been widely applied to management and operations fields. For exam-
ple, Bowman et al. [21] studied a consumption-savings model based on loss aversion
that implies a fundamental asymmetry in consumption behavior. Popescu and Wu [22]
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considered the dynamic pricing problem of a monopolist firm in a market with repeated
interactions. They presented purchase decisions by assessing prices as discounts or sur-
charges relative to the reference price in the spirit of prospect theory. Foellmi et al. [23]
studied the Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey model of optimal economic growth in the presence
of loss aversion and habit formation. They showed that prospect utility can cause the
economy to remain in a steady state with low consumption and low capital.
The existing literature depicted the uncertain information in consumer search prob-
lems by random variable. However, due to the lack of historical data and the impact of
subjective factor, describing the uncertainty as randomness is not adequately reasonable.
Uncertain measure is an alternative tool to characterize such uncertain information that
has no any historical data and cannot be exactly predicted in advance. Liu [5] gave the
basic concepts about uncertainty theory, such as uncertain variable, uncertainty distribu-
tion, expected value, and variance. From then on, uncertainty theory attracts considerable
attention among researchers in many fields as an important role of mathematical model
to deal with human uncertainty. For instance, Mu [24] studied the implementation of the
employment relationship problem between the enterprise and the rural migrant worker,
where enterprise’s assessment on the rural migrant worker’s own income at home is char-
acterized as an uncertain variable. Lan and Du [25] considered a warranty contracting
problem faced by a buyer who purchases products from a supplier and then sells them
to consumers under uncertain demand. Zhou et al. [26] studied a dynamic recruitment
problem with enterprise performance in the uncertain environment and presented an
optimal search strategy for the firm’s employment decisions. Wang et al. [27] considered
a wage contract design problem faced by an employer who employs an employee to work
in labor market and characterized the employee’s ability as an uncertain variable. Wu
et al. [28] studied the agency problem with multiple uncertain information. They intro-
duced confidence level to quantify the degree of the agent’s risk aversion and examined
the effects of the agent’s attitude toward risk on the optimal contract and the principal’s
income.
As an important extension of uncertainty theory, chance theory was pioneered by
Liu [6] for modeling complex systems with not only uncertainty but also randomness.
And then, many researchers proposed uncertain random programming [29], uncertain
random process [30], uncertain random graph, and uncertain random network [31].
In addition, Sheng and Yao [32] provided some formulas to calculate the variance of
uncertain random variables through chance distribution and inverse chance distribution.
Zhou et al. [33] proposed uncertain randommulti-objective programming for optimizing
multiple, non-commensurable, and conflicting objectives.
Preliminaries
This section will introduce some basic results in uncertainty theory and chance theory.
The former is a branch of axiomatic mathematics for modeling belief degrees, and the
latter is a methodology for modeling complex systems with not only uncertainty but also
randomness.
Uncertainty theory
Let  be a nonempty set andL a σ -algebra over . Each element inL is called an event.
Liu [5] defined an uncertain measure by the following axioms:
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Axiom 1. (Normality axiom)M{} = 1 for the universal set .
Axiom 2. (Duality axiom)M{} +M{c} = 1, ∀ ∈ L.
Axiom 3. (Subadditivity axiom)M {⋃∞i=1 i} ≤ ∑∞i=1M{i}, ∀i ∈ L, i = 1, 2, . . .
The triplet (,L,M) is called an uncertainty space. Furthermore, Liu [34] defined a
product uncertain measure by the fourth axiom:
Axiom 4. (Product axiom) Let (k ,Lk ,Mk) be uncertainty spaces for k = 1, 2, . . .. Then,










wherek are arbitrarily chosen events from Lk for k = 1, 2, . . ., respectively.
An uncertain variable was defined by Liu [5] as a function ξ from an uncertainty space
(,L,M) to the set of real numbers such that {ξ ∈ B} = {ν ∈  |ξ(ν) ∈ B } is an event
for any Borel set B. The uncertainty distribution of an uncertain variable ξ was defined
by Liu [5] as (x) = M{ξ ≤ x} for any real number x. Peng and Iwamura [35] verified
that a function : R →[ 0, 1] is an uncertainty distribution if and only if it is a monotone
increasing function except (x) ≡ 0 and (x) ≡ 1. An uncertainty distribution (x) is
said to be regular if it is a continuous and strictly increasing function with respect to x at
which 0 < (x) < 1, and:
lim
x→−∞(x) = 0, limx→+∞(x) = 1.
Let ξ be an uncertain variable with regular uncertainty distribution (x). The inverse
function−1(α) is called the inverse uncertainty distribution of ξ [36]. Liu [37] also veri-
fied that a function−1(α) : (0, 1) → R is an inverse uncertainty distribution if and only
if it is a continuous and strictly increasing function with respect to α.
The expected value of an uncertain variable ξ was defined by Liu [5] as follows:
E [ξ ] =
∫ +∞
0




provided that at least one of the two integrals is finite. If ξ has an uncertainty distribution
, then the expected value may be calculated by:
E [ξ ] =
∫ +∞
0




or equivalently, E [ξ ] = ∫ +∞−∞ xd(x). If is also regular, then:













M {ξi ∈ Bi}
for any Borel sets B1,B2, . . . ,Bn of real numbers. Moreover, if ξ and η are independent
uncertain variables with finite expected values, then:
E[ d1ξ + d2η]= d1E[ ξ ]+d2E[ η]
for any real numbers d1 and d2, which is referred to as the linearity of expected value
operator.
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Lemma 1. (Liu [36]) Let ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξn be independent uncertain variables with regu-
lar uncertainty distributions 1,2, . . . ,n, respectively. If the function f (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
is strictly increasing with respect to x1, x2, . . . , xm and strictly decreasing with respect to





−11 (α), . . . ,−1m (α),−1m+1(1 − α), . . . ,−1n (1 − α)
)
.
Liu and Ha [38] proved that the uncertain variable ξ has an expected value:





−11 (α), . . . ,−1m (α),−1m+1(1 − α), . . . ,−1n (1 − α)
)
dα.
Lemma 2. (Liu and Ha [38]) Let ξ be an uncertain variable on the uncertainty space
(,L,M) with uncertain distribution (x). If g : R → R is a monotone function, the




] = ∫ +∞
−∞
g (x) d(x).
Lemma 3. (Zhou et al. [26]) Let ξ be an uncertain variable with uncertainty distribution
function(·). Assume that the support of ξ is [ a, b], we have:




where 0 ≤ a ≤ z ≤ b.
The definition of first-order uncertain dominance [39] is based on the uncertainty
distribution functions of uncertain variables as follows:
Definition 1. Let ζ1 and ζ2 be two uncertain variables with the uncertainty distribution
functions 
1(x) and 
2(x), respectively. We say that ζ1 uncertainly dominates ζ2 in the
first order, denoted by ζ1 	 ζ2, if and only if 
1(x) ≤ 
2(x) for all x ∈ R.
Chance theory
Let (,L,M) be an uncertainty space and let (,A, Pr) be a probability space. Then, the
product (,L,M) × (,A, Pr) is called a chance space. Essentially, it is another triplet
( × ,L×A,M× Pr), where × is the universal set,L×A is the product σ -algebra,
andM× Pr is the product measure.
The universal set  ×  is the set of all ordered pairs of the form (ν,ω), where ν ∈ 
and ω ∈ . That is,  ×  = {(ν,ω)|ν ∈ ,ω ∈ }. The product σ -algebra L×A is the
smallest σ -algebra containing measurable rectangles of the form×A, where ∈ L and
A ∈ A. Any element  in L×A is called an event in the chance space. Then, the chance




Pr {ω ∈ |M{ν ∈ |(ν,ω) ∈ } ≥ x} dx.
Liu [6] proved that the chance measure Ch{} is a monotone increasing function of 
and Ch{ × A} = M{} × Pr{A} for any  ∈ L and any A ∈ A. Especially, it holds that
Ch{∅} = 0, Ch{ ×} = 1. Liu [6] also proved that the chance measure is self-dual. That
is, for any event, we have Ch{}+Ch{c} = 1. Furthermore, Hou [40] proved that the
chance measure is subadditive.
An uncertain random variable was defined by Liu [6] as a function η from a chance
space (,L,M) × (,A, Pr) to the set of real numbers such that {η ∈ B} is an event
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in L × A for any Borel set B. In addition, Liu [6] defined the chance distribution of an
uncertain random variable η as(x) = Ch{η ≤ x} for any x ∈ R.
Assume κ1, κ2, . . . , κm are independent random variables with probability distributions
K1,K2, . . . ,Km, and τ1, τ2, . . . , τn are independent uncertain variables with uncertainty
distributions ϒ1,ϒ2, . . . ,ϒn, respectively. Liu [29] proved that the uncertain random
variable:
η = f (κ1, . . . , κm, τ1, . . . , τn)
has a chance distribution (x) = ∫Rm F(x; y1, . . . , ym)dK1(y1) . . . dKm(ym), where
F(x; y1, . . . , ym) is the uncertainty distribution of uncertain variable:
f (y1, . . . , ym, τ1, . . . , τn)
for any real numbers y1, . . . , ym.
Lemma 4. (Liu [29]) Let κ1, κ2, . . . , κm be independent random variables with probability
distributions K1,K2, . . . ,Km, respectively, and let τ1, τ2, . . . , τn be uncertain variables (not
necessarily independent), then the uncertain random variable:
η = f (κ1, . . . , κm, τ1, . . . , τn)






f (y1, . . . , ym, τ1, . . . , τn)
]
dK1(y1) . . . dKm(ym),
where E
[
f (y1, . . . , ym, τ1, . . . , τn)
]
is the expected value of the uncertain variable
f (y1, . . . , ym, τ1, . . . , τn) for any real numbers y1, . . . , ym.
Themodel without prospect utility
In this section, the consumer search model without prospect utility is presented in
a hybrid uncertain environment. Furthermore, the optimal stopping rule and optimal
search strategy are proposed, and we discuss how the search cost, the probability of
stockout, and the risky ordering of products affect the consumer’s purchase threshold.
Consider a consumer who seeks sequentially to buy the best selection among a finite
number n ≥ 2 of differentiated but substitutable products indexed by 1, 2, . . . , n. The
consumer must incur a search cost ci in order to search product i and evaluate it, ∀ i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n}. It is assumed that the consumer searches sequentially, such that a consumer
is able to evaluate product i before deciding whether or not to search the next product.
The subjective valuation of the consumer to product i is assumed to be an uncertain
variable ξi with support [ a, b], where 0 ≤ a < b < +∞. Denote by i(x) the uncertainty
distribution of ξi and let φi(x) = di(x)/dx. Search is also with limited recall. Having
searched product i, he/she is free to return to buy its product at any later point only if
product i is in stock with probability p. The consumer has two choices, one is to continue
searching, i.e., he/she would compare the current product with the best previous product
and choose a better one as a reserved product; alternatively, he/she can stop searching
and buy the reserved product.
Let the collection I = {1, 2, . . . , n} be partitioned into the setQ of encountered products
and its complement Q of not encountered products. That is, Q ∪ Q = I, and Q ∩ Q = ∅.
Zhou et al. Journal of Uncertainty Analysis and Applications  (2015) 3:6 Page 8 of 20








where ξˆi is a realization of ξi. For ease of exposition, the product with valuation z is simply
expressed as the reserved product z. Let V (z,Q) represent the value function of the con-
sumer, with the choice variable being a binary decision between stopping or continuing
the search when the set of encountered products is Q. Define (z,Q) as the consumer’s
benefit from choosing to stop now. When the consumer buys a product, we suppose that
the benefit is equal to the subjective valuation of the product. That is to say,
(z,Q) = z. (2)
The objective of the consumer is to find an optimal search strategymaximizing the benefit
from the search. Such a problem can be formally described in a dynamic programming
format [41]. Therefore, we can express the value function V (z,Q) as follows:




{βE [V (ηi,Q ∪ {i})] − ci}
}
, (3)
where ηi = max{ξi, z} is an uncertain random variable and β denotes a discount factor
with 0 < β < 1. That is, the reserved product zmay be unpurchasable due to out of stock
with probability 1− p, and the reserved product zmay be purchasable with probability p.
According to Zhou et al. [26] and Lippman and McCall [42], the solution to the above
multi-period dynamic programming problem is equivalent to solving a one-period static
problem satisfying myopic property.
Starting from a point in time, we suppress the time dimension of the problem. To a
consumer, the benefit from stopping the search isstop(z) = z. If the consumer continues
the search and the realized valuation of the next product is max{ξˆi, z}, the ex post benefit










Therefore, the expected benefit from continuing the search becomes:
search(z) = E [search(ξi, z)] = βE [max{ξi, z}] − ci
= βpE [max{ξi, z}] + β(1 − p)E [max{ξi, 0}] − ci. (5)
By Lemma 3, Equation 5 can be rewritten as follows:
search(z) = βb − βpzi(z) − β
∫ b
z
i(x)dx − β(1 − p)
∫ z
a
i(x)dx − ci. (6)
By the myopic property of the optimal search strategy, we define a difference function as
follows:
D(z) search(z) − stop(z)
= βb − z − βpzi(z) − β
∫ b
z







dz = −1 − βpzφi(z) < 0. (8)
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) = 0 exists uniquely. Thus, the critical number zLNi which satisfies:
βb − zLNi − βpzLNi i(zLNi ) − β
∫ b
zLNi
i(x)dx − β(1 − p)
∫ zLNi
a
i(x)dx − ci = 0 (9)
is called the reservation value of product i.
Remark. If the consumer has historical data of the product value, then the valuationmay
be rationally characterized as random variable. A model similar to Equation 3 can be built
to maximize the consumer’s expected benefit. Suppose that the probability distribution
function of the product i’s valuation is Fi(x). The other parameters and assumptions are
similar to those of the model without prospect utility. However, the reservation value z∗i
satisfies:






Fi(x)dx − ci = 0.
According to the properties of reservation value, the optimal stopping rule and the
optimal search strategy can be prescribed as follows:
Theorem 1. (Optimal stopping rule) If D(z) ≤ 0, stop the search by buying the better
product between the current product and the reserved product z, or else continue the search.
The optimal search strategy specifies the order in which alternative reserved products
should be evaluated in detail and at which point evaluations should stop and a product
be purchased. This strategy is specified and proven to be optimal in Weitzman [43] and
involves the following procedure:
Step 1. Rank the products according to their respective reservation value.
Step 2. Evaluate the products in this order.
Step 3. Buy the first product which obtained score after the detailed evaluation is
greater than the reservation value of the next product to be evaluated.
To discuss more properties of the reservation value, we obtain the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 1.
1) The reservation value is decreasing with respect to the search cost.
2) The reservation value is increasing with respect to the probability of unpurchasable.
3) If product ξi uncertainly dominates product ξj in the first order and ci = cj,
∀i, j ∈ I, then the reservation value zLNi of firm i’s product is larger than the
reservation value zLNj of product j.
Proof.
1) For convenience, define:
Hi(z) = βb − z − βpzi(z) − β
∫ b
z
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By taking the derivative of two sides of the equation Hi
(
zLNi
) = ci with respect to
ci, we have − ∂z
LN
i











) < 0. Therefore, the reservation value zLNi is decreasing with the
search cost ci.
2) By taking the partial derivative of the variable zLNi of equation D
(
zLNi
) = 0 with
























)+ β ∫ zLNi
a
i(x)dx.
By using integration by parts,
[











−β ∫ zLNia xφi(x)dx




Hence, the reservation value zLNi is increasing with the probability 1 − p of
unpurchasable.











Hi(z) = βb − z − βpzi(z) − β
∫ b
z




≥ βb − z − βpzj(z) − β
∫ b
z





Suppose that ci = cj. By Equation 11, Hi
(
zLNi
) = ci = cj = Hj (zLNj ) ≥ Hj (zLNi ).
Since Hi(z) is strictly decreasing in z, we have zLNi ≥ zLNj .
The result 1) in Proposition 1 shows that an increase in the search cost decreases the
reservation value. That is, if the search cost is very costly, the consumer’s purchase thresh-
old will be lowered. There is widespread evidence that the search cost often influences the
consumer’s purchase threshold negatively. Furthermore, we demonstrate that an increase
in the probability of stockout will yield higher reservation value. It implies that greater
probability of stockout leads to higher purchase threshold. Finally, the result implies that
the product that has a good reputation will be preferred in the search process.
Themodel with prospect utility
In this section, the optimal consumer search model is investigated when consumers are
loss averse for a prospect utility function. As discussed before, the optimal stopping
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rule and optimal search strategy are also proposed. In addition, we contrast the two
reservation values in the models with and without prospect utility.
Prospect theory has attracted a good deal of attention as an alternative to the well-
established expected utility theory. The basic idea of prospect theory is that alternatives
are evaluated by a prospect utility function in terms of gains and losses with respect to a
reference point. According to the descriptive foundations of value function proposed by
Kahneman and Tversky [2,4], define the prospect utility function as follows:
U(h, k) = u(h) + R(u(h) − u(k)), (12)
where u(·) represents the instantaneous utility function, and R(·) represents the gain-loss
utility function that satisfies the following form:
R(u(h) − u(k)) =
{
(u(h) − u(k))g , if u(h) − u(k) ≥ 0
−γ (u(k) − u(h))l , if u(h) − u(k) < 0, (13)
where the parameters 0 < g < 1 and 0 < l < 1 represent the coefficients of risk atti-
tude for gains and losses, respectively. As g and l become higher, the consumer tends to
take more risks. In addition, the parameter γ represents the coefficient of loss aversion.
When γ > 1, the consumer is more sensitive to the loss. It means that people have a rel-
ative distaste for losses when comparing very small losses to very small gains. There is
strong empirical evidence on loss aversion, in which the loss aversion index γ is estimated
between 1.75 and 2.5 [44]. Therefore, the gain-loss utility function R(u) is an S-shaped
function of the reference utility gapu = u(h) − u(k), with a concave kink atu = 0.
Following the above prospect utility function, we define the prospect utility function of
optimal consumer search as follows:
Usearch(ξˆi, z) = search(ξˆi, z) + R(search(ξˆi, z) − stop(z)), (14)
where





search(ξˆi, z) − stop(z)
)g
, ifsearch(ξˆi, z) − stop(z) ≥ 0
−γ
(
stop(z) − search(ξˆi, z)
)l
, ifsearch(ξˆi, z) − stop(z) < 0.
(15)
Before the consumer decides to make the investment to search, he/she is assumed to be
able to anticipate his/her feelings of gains and losses based on the realized prospect utility.
When the reserved product z is given, the expected utility from continuing the search can
be written as follows:
Usearch(z) = E [Usearch(ξi, z)]
= E [search(ξi, z)] + E
[
R(search(ξi, z) − stop(z))
]
= search(z) + E
[








R(search(ξi, z) − stop(z))
]













(z − βz + ci)l di(x) − (1 − p)γ
∫ b
a
(x − βx + ci)l di(x).
(17)
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The first term on the right hand side of Equation 17 represents the expected gain
utility from reserving the current product and continuing the search. The second term
−pγ ∫ z+ciβz (z − βx + ci)l di(x) represents the expected loss utility from buying the
current product and stopping the search. The third term −pγ ∫ za (z − βz + ci)l di(x)
represents the expected loss utility from buying the reserved product z and stopping the
search if it is available. The last term −(1 − p)γ ∫ ba (x − βx + ci)l di(x) is the expected
loss utility from buying the current product and stopping the search if it is not available.
In a similar way without regard to the prospect utility, we consider that the expected
utility from stopping the search is equivalent to the realized evaluation value z of the
reserved product. Hence, we have:
Ustop(z) = stop(z) = z. (18)
Similarly, we also define a difference function as follows:
Dp(z)  Usearch(z) − Ustop(z)
= search(z) + TR(z) − stop(z)
= D(z) + TR(z).
(19)
Therefore, the optimal stopping rule with prospect utility can be prescribed as follows:
Theorem 2. (Optimal stopping rule) If Dp(z) ≤ 0, stop the search by buying the better
product between the current product and the reserved product z, or else continue the search.
To derive the reservation value of optimal consumer search with prospect utility, it is
easy to prove that:
dDp(z)
dz < 0. (20)














(βx − ci − z)1−g
di(x) < 0, (21)
∂
(
−pγ ∫ z+ciβz (z−βx+ci)ldi(x)
)
∂z
= −pγ l ∫ z+ciβz 1




−pγ ∫ za (z−βz+ci)ldi(x))
∂z









−pγ ∫ za (z − βz + ci)l di(x))
∂z < 0. (22)
Hence, it follows from Equations 8, 21, and 22 that dDp(z)dz < 0. It implies that an increase
in the evaluation value z of reserved product will decrease the expected prospect utility.




0 also uniquely exists. Thus, the critical number zLAi which satisfiesD
(
zLAi
)+TR (zLAi ) = 0
is also the reservation value of firm i’s product under the prospect utility.
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Proposition 2. If βb − ci < zLNi < b, the reservation value in the model with prospect
utility will be lower than that in the model without prospect utility.
Proof. Note that D
(
zLNi































By using the first mean value theorem of integral, we obtain that if there exists












. To prove the assertion, we consider the
following two cases:















(x−βx+ci)l di(x) < 0.











(x−βx+ci)l di(x) < 0.




< 0 = Dp(zLAi ). Since Dp(z) is decreasing
with z, we have zLAi < zLNi . The theorem is thus proven.
Proposition 2 indicates that the prospect utility leads to low reservation value. If the
consumer is more loss averse, we conclude that the purchase threshold will be lower. The
optimal search strategy and Proposition 1 also hold for the prospect utility case.
Comparative statics
In this section, we derive some comparative statics of how the reservation value under
the prospect utility would respond to the changes in the parameters g, l, and γ . We first
examine the effect of risk coefficient g for gains on reservation value zLAi .
Proposition 3. Holding other parameters of the model constant, the reservation value of
the firm’s product under the prospect utility, which satisfies a ≤ zLAi < βb − ci − 2, is
increasing with respect to the coefficient of risk attitude for gains. And that which satisfies
βb− ci − 2 ≤ zLAi ≤ b is decreasing with respect to the coefficient of risk attitude for gains.
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Proof. From the previous discussion of Dp(z), we can obtain that the function Dp(z)












(βx − ci − z)g ln(βx − ci − z)φi(x)dx
−pg ∫ bz+ci
β










−pγ l(1 − β)∫ za (z − βz + ci)l−1 φi(x) ∂zLAi∂g dx = 0
by using the equation:
∂ (βx − ci − z)g
∂g = (βx − ci − z)









(βx − ci − z)g ln(βx − ci − z)φi(x)dx
N ,
where:




(βx − ci − z)g−1 φi(x)dx
+pγ l ∫ z+ciβz (z − βx + ci)l−1 φi(x)dx + pγ l(1−β)∫ za (z − βz + ci)l−1 φi(x)dx.
Since ln(βx − ci − z) could be positive or negative, it holds that ∂z
LA
i
∂g > 0 if a ≤ zLAi <
βb − ci − 2, and ∂z
LA
i
∂g < 0 if βb − ci − 2 ≤ zLAi ≤ b.
Proposition 3 indicates that as the risk coefficient g for gains becomes higher, the
consumer raises his/her reservation value of low-value product and reduces his/her reser-
vation value of high-value product. This implies that the consumer’s purchase threshold
for low-value product will be increased with the coefficient of risk attitude for gains,
and the consumer’s purchase threshold for high-value product will be decreased with the
coefficient of risk attitude for gains.
Next, we examine the effect of risk coefficient l for losses on reservation value zLAi .
Proposition 4. Holding other parameters of the model constant, if a ≤ zLAi < 1−ci1−β and
a+b
2 ≤ 1−ci1−β , the reservation value under the prospect utility is increasing with respect to
the coefficient of risk attitude for losses. If 2−ci1−β < zLAi ≤ b and 1−ci1−β < a+b2 , the reservation
value under the prospect utility is decreasing with respect to the coefficient of risk attitude
for losses.
Proof. By taking the partial derivative of the variable zLAi of equation Dp
(
zLAi
) = 0 with












−pγ ∫ z+ciβz (z−βx+ci)lln(z−βx+ci)φi(x)dx−pγ l ∫ z+ciβz (z−βx+ci)l−1φi(x) ∂zLAi∂l dx
−pγ∫ za(z−βz+ci)lln(z−βz+ci)φi(x)dx−pγ l(1−β)∫ za(z−βz+ci)l−1 φi(x) ∂zLAi∂l dx
−(1−p)γ ∫ ba(x−βx+ci)lln(x−βx+ci)φi(x)dx = 0.




−pγ ∫ z+ciβz S(x)φi(x)dx−pγ ∫ za S(z)φi(x)dx−(1−p)γ ∫ ba S∗(x)φi(x)dx
N ,
where:




(βx − ci − z)g−1 φi(x)dx
+ pγ l ∫ z+ciβz (z − βx + ci)l−1 φi(x)dx + pγ l(1−β)∫ za (z − βz + ci)l−1 φi(x)dx,
S(x) = (z − βx + ci)l ln(z − βx + ci) and S∗(x) = (x − βx + ci)l ln(x − βx + ci). Since
a ≤ zLAi < 1−ci1−β < 2−ci1−β , it holds that −pγ
∫ z+ci
β
z S(x)φi(x)dx > 0. Furthermore, it




aS(z)φi(x)dx > 0. When
a+b
2 ≤ 1−ci1−β , we have
−(1 − p)γ ∫ baS∗(x)φi(x)dx > 0. Hence, if a ≤ zLAi < 1−ci1−β and a+b2 ≤ 1−ci1−β , ∂zLAi∂l > 0.
If 2−ci1−β < zLAi ≤ b, it holds that −pγ
∫ z+ci
β




1−β < zLAi that −pγ
∫ z




2 , we have −(1 −
p)γ
∫ b
aS∗(x)φi(x)dx < 0. Consequently, if
2−ci
1−β < zLAi ≤ b and 1−ci1−β < a+b2 , we have
∂zLAi
∂l < 0.
Proposition 4 indicates that an increase in the the risk coefficient l for losses raises
the reservation value of low-value product and reduces the reservation value of high-
value product. This means that when the coefficient of risk attitude for losses is very high,
the consumer would raise the purchase threshold for low-value product and reduce the
purchase threshold for high-value product.
Finally, we can investigate the effect of coefficient of loss aversion on the reservation
value zLAi .
Proposition 5. Holding other parameters of the model constant, the reservation value of
the firm’s product under the prospect utility is decreasing with respect to the coefficient of
loss aversion.
Proof. By taking the partial derivative of the variable zLAi of equation Dp
(
zLAi
) = 0 with







− pg ∫ bz+ci
β





−p ∫ z+ciβz (z−βx+ci)lφi(x)dx − pγ l ∫ z+ciβz (z−βx+ci)l−1φi(x) ∂zLAi∂γ dx
−p∫ za (z−βz+ci)lφi(x)dx − pγ l(1 − β)∫ za (z − βz + ci)l−1 φi(x) ∂zLAi∂γ dx







z W1φi(x)dx − p
∫ z









(βx − ci − z)g−1 φi(x)dx
+pγ l ∫ z+ciβz (z − βx + ci)l−1 φi(x)dx + pγ l(1−β)∫ za (z − βz + ci)l−1 φi(x)dx
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andW1 = (z−βx+ci)l,W2 = (z−βz+ci)l,W3 = (x − βx + ci)l.
From Proposition 5, it shows that the reservation value of the firm’s product is decreas-
ing with the coefficient of loss aversion, that is to say, the consumer who has more
sensitive to the loss will search for much less products. Hence, the above propositions
make it clear that risk attitude for searching high-value product and loss aversion would
indeed lead to ‘too little search.’
Numerical examples
In this section, some numerical examples are given to illustrate the reservation val-
ues under the models without and with prospect utility and examine the effects of
risk attitude for gains, risk attitude for losses, and loss aversion on the optimal search
strategy.
Suppose a consumer must decide to buy one among three products. Because the
three products are differentiated but substitutable, the consumer only knows different
uncertainty distributions about the three products. Without loss of generality, suppose
the consumer’s valuations for the three products are linear uncertain variables L (1, 9),
Z (1, 4, 9), and Z (1, 7, 9), respectively. Let β = 0.9, p = 0.7, c1 = 0.5, c2 = 1, and
c3 = 1.5. By Equation 9, the reservation values of products can be calculated as zLN1 = 3.5,
zLN2 = 2.4, and zLN3 = 3.6. Therefore, the consumer can rank the products according to
their respective reservation value so that zLN3 > zLN1 > zLN2 . Then, the consumer can
evaluate three products in accordance with the order of the reservation value and make a
purchase decision through the optimal search strategy without prospect utility. Similarly,




To illustrate the reservation values under the models without and with prospect utility
numerically, suppose the parameters g = 0.5, l = 0.5, and γ = 2. Without loss of gen-
erality, we only consider the first product when the parameters β = 0.9, p = 0.7, and
c1 = 0.5 remain unchanged. From Figure 1, we observe that zLA1 < zLN1 . However, the
sufficient condition 7.6 < zLN1 < 9 of Proposition 2 cannot hold. It implies that the reser-
vation value zLNi which does not satisfy the sufficient condition may give rise to the result
of Proposition 2.
We find our key results continue to hold in our numerical studies. When the risk coef-
ficient g for gains can be chosen in the set {0.5, 0.7, 0.9}, Figure 2 reports our findings for
β = 0.9, p = 0.7, c1 = 0.5, l = 0.5, and γ = 2, which is representative, and other parame-
ter combinations considered in our studies also yield similar results. As expected, Figure 2
shows the reservation value of low-value product which satisfies 1 ≤ zLA1 < 5.6 will be
increased with the coefficient of risk attitude for gains. When the risk coefficient l for
losses can be chosen in the set {0.5, 0.7, 0.9} and the other parameters β = 0.9, p = 0.7,
c1 = 0.5, g = 0.5, and γ = 2 remain unchanged, Figure 3 shows that the reservation
value of low-value product which satisfies 1 ≤ zLA1 < 5 is increasing with respect to the
coefficient of risk attitude for losses.
Finally, the effect of loss aversion on the reservation value can be examined. Without
loss of generality, suppose the coefficient γ of loss aversion can be chosen in the set
{1.5, 2, 2.5} and the other parameters β = 0.9, p = 0.7, c1 = 0.5, g = 0.5, and l = 0.5
remain unchanged. From Figure 4, it is apparent that the reservation value of the firm’s
product is decreasing with the coefficient of loss aversion.
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Figure 1 A comparison between reservation values.
Conclusion
This paper presented a consumer search model with prospect utility, in which the subjec-
tive valuations of the consumer to every firm’s product were assumed to be independent
but not identically distributed uncertain variables, and the valuation of a reserved prod-
uct with probabilistic stockout was consequently characterized as an uncertain random
variable. An optimal stopping rule and an optimal search strategy were proposed to
maximize the benefit of the consumer. Moreover, we studied the consumer’s purchase
threshold in the model without and with prospect utility. The results demonstrated that
the prospect utility will lead to the low purchase threshold. We found that the con-
sumer’s purchase threshold is decreasing with search cost and is increasing with the
probability of stockout. Furthermore, we also found that the product that has a good rep-
utation will become the preferred product in the search process. In addition, the risk













Figure 2 Effect of risk attitude for gains on the reservation value of low-value product.
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Figure 3 Effect of risk attitude for losses on the reservation value of low-value product.
coefficients for gains and losses will raise the consumer’s purchase threshold for low-
value product, while they will reduce the purchase threshold for high-value product. To
provide a simple explanation for why consumers generally stop searching too early, we
showed that the loss aversion will reduce the consumer’s purchase threshold. Finally, some
numerical examples were given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed models and
conclusions.
In the future work, we can incorporate advertisement into consumer search in the pres-
ence of loss aversion. For instance, firms will post-advertise to improve their goodwill and
induce consumers to buy their products. In addition, it is also interesting to study con-
sumer inertia in the dynamic search and examine the effects of prospect utility on the
consumer inertia.














Figure 4 Effect of loss aversion on the reservation value.
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Endnotes
aThis statistical result is publicly available at http://hbr.org/2004/05/stock-outs-cause-
walkouts.
bThis means the product which obtained low score. Similarly, ‘high-value product’
means the product which obtained high score.
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